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ECONOMIC LOSS, 402A, AND AN UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS PRODUCT: CAN MID CONTINENT
AIRCRAFT, SIGNAL OIL, AND NOBILITY HOMES
BE RECONCILED?
J. NEVIN SHAFFER, JR.
What will the mode of recovery be in a case in which an unreasonably
dangerous product damages itself? The rapid development of products
liability law has made the answer to this question less than clear in many
jurisdictions. Confusion has resulted from the confrontation between new
rules and their common law predecessors.' This confusion is evidenced by
three recent Texas Supreme Court opinions which have addressed the issue
of economic loss. In Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers' the court decided that
strict liability in tort is not the proper vehicle for recovery of damages for
economic loss but that recovery is available under a contract theory.' In
Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc.4
economic loss was defined to include damage that a defective product
causes to itself5 and the remedy for this loss was held to be adequately
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).5 As a result of these
two decisions, the court held in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil
Products7 that strict liability in tort was applicable only so long as the
product causes damage to a person or to "other" property.' The question
presented by these holdings is whether labeling as economic loss the damages caused by an unreasonably dangerous, defective product is based
upon sound principles and reasoning.
THE INTERTWINED HISTORY OF TORT AND CONTRACT
Tort and contract law have a long and convoluted history.9 While usually
1. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in DefectiveProduct Cases, 18 STANFORD L. Rav. 974, 974-79 (1966).
2. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
3. Id. at 78. Economic loss has been variously defined but generally it is considered to
include loss of the benefit of the bargain, loss of value, and loss of repair cost. See Ribstein,
Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REv. 493, 496 (1978).
4. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
5. Id. at 312-13.
6. Id. at 313; see Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. 1977); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314 (implied warranty of merchantability) & 2.315 (implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
7. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
8. Id. at 325; see Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc.,
572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex.
1977)..
9. See generally Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STANFORD L. REv. 713, 728-34 (1970).
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considered as separate bases for the orderly functioning of society, they
overlap to some degree. This is evidenced by the fact that both tort, under
the strict liability theory, and contract, under the UCC, allow recovery for
a product that fails to perform as promised. Since most products liability
litigation involves both tort and contract principles, there is little wonder
that judicial decisions are often confusing and conflicting. 0
Common Origin
The confusion evidenced in current decisions, between contract law on
the one hand and tort law on the other, has its roots deep in common law."
Breach of warranty, for instance; was originally a common law tort similar
to deceit." From this unity the two bodies of law grew steadily apart until
contract law became the recognized medium for commercial transactions
and matters such as warranty disputes. 3 Tort law, on the other hand, was
concerned with redressing wrongful injury to persons or property.' The
advent of the industrial revolution, however, resulted in manufacturers'
becoming farther removed from consumers. This remoteness, without a
commensurate relaxation of contract privity requirements," eventually
10. See Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L.
REV. 493, 493-96 (1978).
11. See W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 25 (2d ed. 1920); Ames, The History of
Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1888).
12. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 616, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1942);
see W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 25 (2d ed. 1920); S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING
SALES OF GOODS § 195 (rev. ed. 1948); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1126 (1960).
13. See Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 616, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831
(1942); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-3 (2d ed. 1977); W. PAGE, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 26 (2d ed. 1920); S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS §§
195, 196 (rev. ed. 1948).
14. Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696, 699 (10th Cir. 1940) (torts are of two general classes:
personal and property); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 36 F. Supp. 79, 80 (D. Minn. 1941)
(two classes of torts are injury to person and damage to property); Cooper v. Steen, 318
S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, no writ) (action in tort is one for personal or
property injury); Wartman v. Empire Loan Co., 101 S.W. 499, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no
writ) (tort is an injury to person or property); see T. COOLEY, THE ELEMENTS OF TomS 2021 (1895); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (4th ed. 1971); W. SEAVEY, P. KERTON & R.
KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed. 1964).
15. 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.02 (1977); Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict
Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1, 3 (1976-77). Other contributing factors were the
growth of society and general economic expansion as well as changes in marketing procedures.
Id. at 3.
16. Privity of contract has been described as the "connection, mutuality of intention,
and interaction" of the parties to a contract. See Van Buren Div. of the Toledo & S.H.R. Co.
v. Lamphear, 20 N.W. 590, 593 (Mich. 1884). Another court has described it as a "legal
relationship to the contract or its parties." See La Mourea v. Rhude, 295 N.W. 304, 307
(Minn. 1940). Still another has said that it "implies a connection, mutuality of will, and
interaction of parties." See State v. District Court, 420 P.2d 845, 847 (Mont. 1966). See also
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 243 (2d ed. 1977).
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drew these two bodies of law back toward each other." It became increasingly apparent that privity of contract, a reasonable requirement in less
commercialized times, had become an irrational barrier protecting the
manufacturer responsible for producing defective products from liability
to innocent and injured purchasers."I
Initially, the courts responded to the need to remove the privity barrier
by providing injured consumers a remedy upon proof of the manufacturer's
negligence.' 9 The leading case in this area, MacPherson v. Buick Motor
2
Co.,"0 laid the groundwork for recovery despite lack of privity. ' Even
though negligence suits were generally restricted to cases of personal injury, 2 a few courts successfully applied the negligence theory to cases of
"economic loss".3 Proof of negligence was often difficult or impossible for
the consumer to show, 2' however, and the courts developed various other
17. See 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAw § 32.02 (1977); Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict
Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. Rv. 1, 3 (1976-77).
18. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 799-800 (1966); Prosser,
The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1100 (1960). See also Comment,
Product Liability and the Privity Rule, Circa 1964, 7 S. TEX. L.J. 118, 118-21 (1963-64).
19. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960). See also Seely
v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965).
20. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
21. See id. at 1053 (remote manufacturer held liable for negligent construction of car
with defective wooden-spoked wheels).
22. E.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Brown, 113 So. 2d 916, 917 (Ala. 1959) (plaintiff injured
by negligently manufactured tire); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 694 (Mass. 1946)
(plaintiff burned by toxic perfume); Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 64 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Wis.
1954) (plaintiff shocked by negligently manufactured refrigerator). See generally Prosser, The
Assault upon the Citidel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103 (1960); Comment, The Vexing Problem of
the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SarON
HALL L. REv. 145, 147 (1972).
23. See International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52, 53-54 (10th Cir. 1953); C.D.
Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1956); Quackenbush v. Ford Motor
Co., 153 N.Y.S. 131, 133 (App. Div. 1915). In International'Harvesterthe plaintiff recovered
for damage caused to his truck as a result of defendant's negligent inspection. The plaintiff
showed that the defective parts caused the accident, and the court held that recovery under
negligence was available when the nature of the product, if negligently constructed, placed
life or limb in danger. International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52, 54 (10th Cir. 1953).
In C.D. Herme plaintiff recovered for the cost of damage to his trailer after alleging that the
defendant negligently failed to exercise reasonable care in the inspection of the trailer. The
court held that once the jury determined that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care
in inspection, the fact that only a person's property was injured did not relieve the manufacturer of liability. C.D. Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1956). In
Quackenbush plaintiff's car was damaged when the brakes failed. The court rejected the
defendant's theory that it would be liable for its negligent construction only if personal injury
was caused thereby. Instead, the court held that the defendant's liability depended on its
failure to properly construct the car and not upon whether either a person or his property
was injured. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 153 N.Y.S. 131, 133 (App. Div. 1915).
24. Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Mich. 1961) (impossible to show negligence in manufacture of one of a million bottles). See also W. PROSSER,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 103 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely
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theories designed to scale the privity barrier. 5
Eventually, tort and contract were tied together by the theory of an
implied warranty running with the product to the consumerY In 1942 the
Texas Supreme Court adopted this theory in Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc.
v. Capps.27 The basis of the liability imposed in Decker was not found in
any implied terms of the contract of sale,2" but liability was based on a
broad public policy aimed at protecting the life and health of consumers. 2
The theory of implied warranty based on tort policy has been described as
a freak hybrid of tort and contract law. 30 It was an improvement, though,
over a negligence cause of action because the plaintiff could simply prove
a breach of warranty rather than negligence.31
Strict Liability In Tort
The need to separate tort from contract law was illustrated by the implied warranty theory. While the theory was effective in defeating contract
privity requirements and providing recovery without proof of negligence it
was still subject, as a warranty, to other contract defenses such as disclaimers and notice requirements.12 The search for a more satisfactory
Economic Loss in ProductsLiability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REV.
145, 147 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391, 392 (3d Cir. 1932)
(marketing is offer to warrant product if consumer buys); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161
N.E. 557, 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) (retailer is manufacturer's agent to sell); Wisdom v.
Morris Hardware Co., 274 P. 1050, 1052 (Wash. 1929) (retailer is consumer's agent to buy).
See generally Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1958)
(listing 26 other theories).
26. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965) (warranty
theory borrowed from sales for consumer's benefit); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111
So. 305, 307 (Miss. 1927) (implied warranty runs with title); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith,
97 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1936, no writ) (warranty ran with product
to benefit of consumer).
27. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). Contaminated sausage produced by Decker was
consumed by the Capps family, resulting in sickness in the family and the death of one child.
Id. at 610, 164 S.W.2d at 828.
28. Id. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831-32.
29. Id. at 620, 164 S.W.2d at 833; accord Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787,
789 (Tex. 1967).
30. Santor v. A & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1965); see Prosser, The
Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-27 (1960). Prosser concludes his discussion
of the theory by stating that "if warranty is a matter of tort as well as contract, and if it can
arise without any intent to make it a matter of contract, then it should need no contract;
and it may arise and exist between parties who have not dealt with one another." Id. at 1127.
31. See Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 132 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Mich. 1965); LaHue v.
Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 314 P.2d 421, 422 (Wash. 1957). See also Sales & Perdue, The Law
of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1, 3 (1976-77); Comment, The Vexing
Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy,
4 SErON HALL L. REV. 145, 149 (1972).
32. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966).
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solution was initiated by the New Jersey Supreme court in 1960 in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.33 The implied warranty theory,
with its contract connections, was applied in a manner similar to that of
strict liability in tort. 4 It was subsequently reasoned that strict liability
in tort would more readily ensure that the consumer would be protected
and that the costs of injuries would be borne by those who placed the
defective product on the market."
This same purpose is reflected in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.31 The section extended strict liability to any unreasonably
dangerous, defective product that caused physical harm to a person or his
property.37 The drafters of section 402A indicated that one justification for
imposing strict liability on the manufacturer is that by placing the product
on the market, the manufacturer owes a special responsibility to the public
in the event the product caused injury." Consequently, in the field of
products liability a separate remedy sounding completely in tort, has
evolved.

UCC
The purpose of the UCC was to simplify commercial laws governing
business transactions by unifying several diverse "uniform acts" under one
33. 161 A.2d 69, 84 (N.J. 1960). Plaintiff was injured when her car, purchased from the
defendants, crashed due to an unexplained, undiscoverable defect. Id. at 75. The court concluded that it was unfair and unjust to allow manufacturers to stimulate demand for their
products and then allow them to escape liability when their products injured someone. See
id. at 81.
34. See id. at 84. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
35. Greenman v.- Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698
(1962). Strict liability in tort has been described as similar to an implied warranty action,
and while neither contract nor tort completely, it is more tort than contract. See Keckler v.
Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D. Il1. 1965). Strict liability has been said
to be the same as an implied warranty action "divested of contract doctrines of privity,
disclaimer, and notice." See Fisher v. Gate City Steel Corp., 211 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Neb.
1973). Additionally, the governing principres of the two doctrines have been said to be identical. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879, 884 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states in pertinent part: "One who
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or
to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property . .. .
37. Id.
38. Id. Comment c. Additional reasons given were:.
[Tihe public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs
and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind
their goods; . . . and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum
of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those
who market the products.
Id. Comment c.
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uniform code.39 As written the UCC provides for a measure of damages
determined by the difference between the value of the goods as accepted
and the value of the goods as warranted, as well as consequential and
incidental damages. 0 The typical commercial or economic loss contemplated by the Code therefore includes those cases in which the purchaser
suffers lost profits or repair costs but no personal injury." In any event, if
the product does not perform as warranted the underlying objective of the
UCC is to return the purchaser to the position in which he would be if no
2
breach had occurred.
STRICT LIABILITY AND ECONOMIC Loss

Adoption of strict liability in tort and section 402A by the overwhelming
majority of the states 3 has firmly established the preeminence of tort over
contract law in cases in which physical injury or property damage is caused
by an unreasonably dangerous, defective product." On the other hand,
contract, sales law, and the UCC have traditionally governed cases in
which a defective product damages itself and the resulting loss is merely
pecuniary. 9 The expansion of products liability law, however, has made
unclear the extent to which strict liability should be applied in cases which
formerly would have been considered mere economic loss."
Early Cases
Cases decided in 1965 by the supreme courts of New Jersey and California represent the two different views regarding recovery for economic loss
under a strict liability theory. In the New Jersey case, Santor v.A & M
39. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1 (1972); Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 1 (1967). See also R. ANDERSON, THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102 (2d ed. 1970) (underlying purposes of act).
40. See R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-714(2), -715 (2d ed. 1970).
41. See Franklin, When Words Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimersin DefectiveProduct Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 980-84 (1966).

42. See R.

ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

§ 1-106 (2d ed. 1970).

43. 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.34 (1977) (citing decisions from 34 states).
44. See, e.g., Fresno Air Serv. v. Wood, 43 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969); Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505
S.W.2d 682, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 513 S.W.2d
4 (Tex. 1974).
45. See Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 HoUs. L. REv. 1,
144-49 (1976-77).
46. See, e.g., Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 HoUs. L.
REv. 1, 144-49 (1976-77); Comment, Implied Warrantiesand "Economic Loss, "24 BAYLOR L.
REV. 370, 371-72 (1972); Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO
L. REv. 29, 39-42 (1972). Compare Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781,
797 (5th Cir, 1973) (strict liability not applicable to economic loss) (applying Texas law) with
Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 428 (Wis. 1973) (strict
liability applicable to economic loss) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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Karagheusian, Inc.,11 Mr. Santor had purchased some "grade #1" carpet
that proved defective when it developed unsightly lines. Santor sued the
remote manufacturer for the cost of the carpet but the defendant claimed
that lack of privity precluded any recovery by Santor. Cognizant of the fact
that strict liability had usually been imposed only when personal injury
had been caused by the defective product,' 8 the court reasoned that the
type of injury, whether physical or economic, was irrelevant since the
manufacturer had represented in either instance that the goods were both
suitable and safe for their intended use."
In Seely v. White Motor Co.," the California Supreme Court reached
an opposite conclusion. Mr. Seely sued the remote manufacturer for the
purchase price of a truck and lost business profits due to a defect in the
truck that caused it to bounce violently. The court held that the UCC
properly governed economic losses of this type." Strict liability in tort was
held to be limited to cases of physical harm to a person or his property
caused by a dangerously defective product." Under the reasoning of the
California court, therefore, only if the carpet in Santor"I had been unsafe
and caused injury would strict liability in tort have been available."
Texas Cases
A majority of the courts in the United States have adopted the reasoning
of the California court in Seely and thus have refused to extend strict
liability in tort to instances of simple economic loss in which the product
is not found to be unreasonably dangerous." The Texas Supreme Court
likewise followed this reasoning in Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers." Shivers bought a mobile home found to be defective in workmanship and materials, and unfit for the purposes for which it was sold. The trial court did
not find, however, that the home was unreasonably dangerous or that it
had caused physical harm to the plaintiff or his property. Instead, eco47. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
48. Id. at 312; see Chairaluce v. Stanley Warner Management Corp., 236 F. Supp. 385,
387 (D. Conn. 1964); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Iowa 1972).
49. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1965). If the court
had not held the type of injury to be irrelevant, lack of privity would have barred recovery
under contract law. See id. at 309.
50. 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
51. See id. at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
52. Id. at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
53. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 307 (N.J. 1965).
54. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
55. Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1, 145
(1976-77); see, e.g., Beauchamp v. Wilson, 515 P.2d 41, 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Hawkins
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643, 653 (Neb. 1973); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502,
503 (Or. 1965).
56. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
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nomic loss in the form of loss of market value, was found to be the only
"injury" Shivers had suffered.57 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the distinction developed in Seely and held that economic loss was
adequately provided in the Uniform Commercial Code"8 and that tort law
was properly restricted to cases of personal or property damage. 51 When
the plaintiff's losses relate to the product itself the similarity of this type
of property damage to typical economic loss raises the question which of
the two theories of liability should be applied. Quoting Justice Traynor in
Seely the Texas court noted that the distinction between tort law and the
UCC does not rest with the "luck" of a plaintiff being injured but with the
"nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products."I" In other words, a manufacturer is not held liable in tort
for the level of performance of his product unless the manufacturer makes
such an agreement.6 He is held strictly liable in tort, however, for distributing products "that create unreasonable risks of harm" and cause injury. 2
Since there was only economic loss and no physical harm or unreasonable
risk of danger, recovery in strict liability was not allowed. 3
Nine months later, the same court decided Signal Oil & Gas Co. v.
Universal Oil Products.' Signal sued to recover for property damage and
economic loss resulting from an explosion and fire caused by a defective
oil heater manufactured by defendant. The court held that Signal had
asserted a valid claim of economic loss under strict liability because Signal had alleged the heater was unreasonably dangerous and the product
had caused damage not just to itself but also to other property."
The requirement that damage to "other property" must be alleged in a
suit in strict liability, followed from the holding of the Texas Supreme
Court in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service,
Inc."6 Curry County purchased a rebuilt spray plane "as is"from Mid
57. Id. at 78. The mobile home's value was determined to be $8,750 less than its purchase
price. Id.at 78.
58. Id.at 81.
59. See id.at 80.
60. Id.at 79 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23
(1965)).
61. Id.at 79.
62. Id.at 79; see Mitchell v. Miller, 214 A.2d 694, 698 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965); Allen v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Ky. 1966); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d
240, 248-49 (Tenn. 1966).
63. Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1977). Plaintiff did recover,
however, since the court abolished the privity requirement in actions against a remote manufacturer resulting from the manufacturer's breach of the UCC's implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 81; see 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 865, 866 (1977).
64. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
65. Id.at 325-26. There was dictum by the court that had the jury found in Signal's favor,
the cost of replacing the oil heater could be included with the "other" property damages and
need not be considered economic loss. Id. at 325. See also 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 675 (1978).
66. 572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978).
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Continent. The engine lacked a crucial part, however, and the plane
crashed causing severe damage to itself but no physical harm to any person
or any "other" property. 7 The trial court found the plane unreasonably
dangerous as a result of the engine defect and both lower courts held Mid
Continent strictly liable in tort for the damage to the plane.," The supreme
court, however, held that damage to the product, the plane itself, was only
an economic loss." Since the cost of repair and loss of the benefit of the
bargain were the only injuries Curry County suffered, strict liability in tort
was not applicable.7" Clearly influenced by the commercial nature of the
transaction, the supreme court reversed the lower courts and held, "In
transactions between a commercial seller and a commercial buyer, when
no physical injury has occurred to persons or other property, injury to the
defective product itself is an economic loss governed by the Uniform Commercial Code."' In other words, the court emphasized the commercial
nature of the transaction and held that an unreasonably dangerous and
defective product that only damages itself is not a matter for strict liability
in tort.72 The court did not, as it could easily have done, limit the applicability of section 402A to non-commercial transactions. Instead it held that
section 402A was applicable to business transactions but modified it to
apply only to personal and "other" property damage, thereby giving effect
73
to a valid "as is" disclaimer between two knowledgeable businesses.
Justice Pope criticized the decision, however, by pointing out that the
"other property" damaged in Signal Oil was the remainder of the oil refining unit which included the defective oil heater and which was purchased
as an integral unit.7" Additionally, Justice Pope noted the similarity between Signal Oil and Mid ContinentAircraft, in which the defective engine
damaged the surrounding parts of the airplane, and questioned whether
there was a difference between the two cases in this respect. 5 At the very
least, the cases illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing between the product and "other property". 6 These difficulties are made even more perplex67. Justice Pope indicated, however, that the plaintiff in Mid Continent had actually
alleged and proved that "other" property, agricultural chemicals, had been damaged by the
defective plane. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 332 (Tex. 1978)
(Pope, J., concurring).
68. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308,
310 (Tex. 1978).
69. Id. at 313.
70. See id. at 313.
71. Id. at 313; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
(buyer's incidental and consequential damages).
72. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d

308, 313 (Tex. 1978).
73. See id. at 313.
74. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 332 (Tex. 1978) (Pope,
J., concurring).

75. See id. at 332 (Pope, J., concurring).
76. Accord, State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss. 1966) (recovery

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 3, Art. 8

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:569

ing by the fact that section 402A does not include this "other property"
distinction."
ANALYSIS OF THE Mid Continent DECISION
The majority in Mid Continent Aircraft, relied on five cases from other
jurisdictions for its decision. Analysis of these five cases and of policy
considerations of tort law raises doubt about the validity of the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Mid Continent.8 For example, of the five
cases upon which the majority based its opinion, only one, Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., established the same "other property" distinction. "
Cooley involved a South Carolina resident who purchased a machine to be
used in his chicken and egg business. The machine proved defective and
Cooley sued the English manufacturer for recovery of the cost of the damage to the product itself.8 The federal district court interpreted section
402A, which South Carolina had adopted, to mean that damage to the
person or his other property was required.82 As a result, the court held that
section 402A did not apply when the product only damaged itself.3 The
court gave no reason for such an interpretation, however, and cited no
4
authority.
The other four cases relied on by the majority in Mid Continent do not
support the holding. One of two Georgia cases cited involved an automobile with a defective engine which caused it to overheat. "5 After 27,000
miles the engine was ruined and the plaintiff attempted to recover in tort
for the loss of market value of the car. The Georgia court held that the
allowed for water heater that exploded because plaintiff's other property also destroyed),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).,This case also illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing
between the product and other property, since the incorrectly installed water heater was an
integral part of the house built by the defendant. Id. at 123-24. See generally Keeton, Torts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1978); Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding
Product Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493, 498-501 (1978).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorS § 402A (1965).
78. The five cases cited for support by the court in Mid Continent Aircraft were: Cooley
v. Salopian Indus. Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974); Long Mfg., Inc. v. Grady Tractor
Co., 231'S.E.2d 105 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 602
(Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d
306 (Idaho 1975); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); see
Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312
(1978).
79. 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974).
80. Id. at 1119.
81. It should be noted, however, that the machine was not found to be unreasonably
dangerous and Cooley did not allege damage to himself or any other property. See Cooley v.
Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (D.S.C. 1974).
82. Id. at 1119.
83. Id. at 1119.
84. See id. at 1119.
85. Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 602, 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
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plaintiff's only loss was a pecuniary one and denied recovery in tort for this
purely economic injury. Unlike Mid Continent, however, there was no
finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous.86 The second Georgia case involved a suit for the loss in market value of a defective portable
barn. s7 Again, unlike Mid Continent, there was no accident and no finding
of an unreasonably dangerous defect. 8' Therefore, the court did not allow
recovery under tort for the loss of market value.8' Another cited case was
factually similar to Mid Continent in that it involved the crash of a defective plane." The suit was brought as a breach of warranty under contract
law, though, and lack of privity barred recovery." Strict liability was not
applied as that issue was never raised. 2 A fifth case cited by the majority
was decided on the basis of the unique laws of Nebraska, the state in which
the suit was brought." Nebraska had -not adopted section 402A, and its
laws recognized strict liability only for injury to persons." Recovery under
strict liability was precluded because no person was injured. 5
Other Jurisdictions
In other jurisdictions there are a number of cases in which a result opposite
86. See id. at 604. This case was distinguished by a later decision that allowed a plaintiff
to recover in strict liability when the action was not based solely on an economic loss.
Compare Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 235 S.E.2d 664, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)
(building materials found dangerously defective) with Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc.,
217 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (no finding that burned engine was dangerously
defective).
87. Long Mfg., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 231 S.E.2d 105, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
88. See id. at 106-08.
89. Id. at 107-08. The Georgia court, however, did define economic loss to include the
case in which a defective product causes injury to itself. Id. at 108.
90. Compare Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d
306, 308 (Idaho 1975) with Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv. Inc.,
572 S.W.2d 308, 308 (Tex. 1978).
91. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306, 313
(Idaho 1975). Plaintiff was also barred from recovery for failure to give defendant proper
notice of the alleged breach of warranty. Id. at 314.
92. See id. at 308.
93. Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643, 652 (Neb. 1973).
94. See id. at 652; Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Neb. 1971) (strict
liability allowed only for injury to human beings). Texas, on the other hand follows the
Restatement and allows recovery by a plaintiff for injury to himself or his property. See
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978) (recovery allowed when
unreasonably dangerous product harmed plaintiff); O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover
& Son, 418 S.W.2d 482, 482 (Tex. 1967) (recovery allowed when defective product harmed
plaintiff's property). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
95. See Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643, 653 (Neb. 1973) (plaintiff recovered under the alternative theory of breach of warranty in contract). As further
support, however, the court in Mid Continent cited Dean Keeton as saying that "a damaging
event that harms only the product should be treated as irrelevent to policy considerations
directing liability placement in tort." Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 1978); see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978).
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to Mid Continent has been reached." In fact, several courts have expressly
held that a defective product which causes harm to itself is the proper
subject for application of strict liability in tort. The emphasis in these
cases is on the unreasonable danger of the product and the fact that an
accident occured in which a person's property was damaged."8 Also, in most
of these cases, the product bought by the consumer is considered to be just
as much his property as any other property he owns." The "other property"
distinction emphasized in Mid Continent, therefore, is given little or no
consideration.'"
While certainly not controlling, these and other decisions effectively
illustrate the overly restrictive nature of the Mid Continent decision.',
96. See Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974);
Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974); Cloud
v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977).
97. Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (applying
Oklahoma law); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d
Cir. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania law); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska
1977); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 12i (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1967); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 425-28
(Wis. 1973). In Keystone the plaintiff bought several helicopters "as is" from the defendant.
One crashed, causing damage only to the helicopter itself. The court concluded that if the
crash resulted from an unreasonably dangerous defect, then strict liability in tort and section
402A would apply. Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 148-49
(3d Cir. 1974). In Sterner the plaintiff bought a plane with a rebuilt engine that failed causing the plane to crash and damage itself. The court held that the plaintiff only had to prove
that the defective product caused the damage and that the defect had rendered the plane
unreasonably dangerous. Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 711-13
(10th Cir. 1974).
98. See Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974);
Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974); Cloud
v. Kit Mfg. Co.,563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113, 121 (Miss. 1966) cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 428 (Wis. 1973).
99. See Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974);
Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974); Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 428 (Wis. 1973).,
100. See Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (no
discussion of "other" property distinction); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974) (no discussion of "other" property distinction); Cloud
v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) ("other" property damage not required);
Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 427 (Wis. 1973) (requirement of "other" property damage expressly rejected). But see State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 123-24 (Miss. 1966) (recovery allowed for water heater that exploded, because plaintiff's other property also destroyed), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
101. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975); Bombardi v.
Pochel's Appliance & TV Co,, 515 P.2d 540, 542 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). In Hiigel the trial
court had interpreted section 402A as requiring damage to "other" property. The Colorado
Supreme court ruled that the lower court's interpretation was too narrow and that the better
reading was that damage to the product is covered by section 402A. Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975).
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Section 402A clearly applies in these cases when a defective product is
unreasonably dangerous to a person or his property and damage occurs to
his property.' 2 Since section 402A does not include the words "other property" it is reasonable, especially in light of these cases, that it should apply
when an unreasonably dangerous product damages itself.' 3
Texas Decisions
A line of cases exists in Texas that indicates the proper emphasis for the
court in Mid Continent.104 As early as 1964 the Fifth Circuit, while applying
Texas law, determined that an unreasonably dangerous defect that resulted in a product harming a person should give rise to a cause of action
under strict liability.' 5 The Texas Supreme Court adopted this position in
1967.'"m In subsequent decisions, courts have consistently emphasized the
unreasonable dangerousness of the product and not an "other property"
7
distinction as being the line of demarcation for strict liability recovery.0
In none of these cases was an "other property" distinction, upon which the
majority in Mid Continent relied for its decision,' 0 considered or held to
be determinative.'m Instead, these decisions and others have consistently
based the applicability of strict liability in tort on the unreasonable danger
of the defective product."'
102. E.g., Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir. 1974);
Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974); Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 428 (Wis. 1973).
103. See cases cited notes 102-103 supra. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). See also Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572
S.W.2d 308, 316-17 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying
Texas law); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. 1977); Darryl v. Ford
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d
787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967).
105. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 1964).
106. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967).
107. See, e.g., Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. 1977); Darryl v.
Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 468 S.W.2d 505, 506-07
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ).
108. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308,
313 (Tex. 1978). See also Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24
(1965). In fact, Seely, which formed the basis of the Texas Supreme Court decision in Nobility
Homes, never considered the "other" property aspect. Instead the court in Seely held that
without proof that the "bouncing" defect caused damage to the truck itself, strict liability
would not lie. Id. at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. Additionally, there was no finding of unreasonable danger in Seely. See id. at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
109. See Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. 1977); Darryl v.
Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 468 S.W.2d 505, 506-07
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ).
110. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 1964) (wheel chair from
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Policy Considerations

While many theories have existed that stress why tort liability has been
imposed, the public policy considerations have changed little.", From its

early beginning with contaminated food to its current extension to any
type of defective product, the fundamental policy of strict liability in tort
has always been to protect the innocent consumer from unreasonable risks
of harm."' In this respect, the manufacturer who actively solicits purchases
is logically responsible for any dangerously defective products he distrib-

utes."' Therefore, when a manufacturer does distribute an unreasonably
dangerous, defective product the harm done is countered by strict liability
in tort under section 402A."1
which wheel fell found unreasonably dangerous) (applying Texas law); Darryl v. Ford Motor
Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969) (defective brakes found unreasonably dangerous); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastiand 1971, writ dism'd)
(ineffective weed control chemical not found unreasonably dangerous); Thermal Supply, Inc.
v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ) (defective air conditioner
not found unreasonably dangerous).
111. See McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444,
448 (Ct. App. 1976); Milau Assocs., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251,
398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (1977); Klages v. General Ordinance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d 304, 310
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). In McDonald the court listed four policies as justification for strict
liability: to provide a shortcut to liability when negligence is hard to prove, to provide
incentive to manufacture safer products, to reallocate resources for product safety, and to
spread the risk of loss among all users. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood
Bank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (Ct. App. 1976). In Milau the court held that strict liability
was based on sound social policies including "consumer reliance, marketing responsibility
and the reasonableness of imposing loss redistribution." Milau Assocs., Inc. v. North Ave.
Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (1977). In Klages the court held
that a few reasons for strict liability were "the inability of the consumer to protect himself
against defectively manufactured goods, the superior risk-bearing ability of the manufacturer, [and] the lack of a sound basis in public policy to allow the manufacturer to avoid
responsibility ...." Klages v. General Ordinance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d 304, 310 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1976).
112. Lemley v. J. & B. Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (strict liability
based on social policy of protection of the consumer); Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 572
P.2d 737, 739 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (purpose of strict liability is protection of consumer);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTs § 402A, Comment c (1965). Comment c states in pertinent part: "On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be
injured by it. ...
Id.
113. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978)
(manufacturer who distributed product has burden of loss for injury caused by defective
product); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)
(cornerstone of liability is fact that manufacturer actively placed product in stream of commerce); Holmquist v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977)
(manufacturer liable for distribution of unreasonably dangerous defective product that injures person or property).
114. See cases cited notes 112-113, supra.
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The Mid Continent decision goes a long way toward abrogating this
basic policy of tort law."' No justification exists either in tort law or section 402A for the arbitrary separation of a person's property between his
"other property" and the product itself."' The policy that seeks to compensate for damage caused by unreasonably dangerous products does not require that recovery be limited to the person who could not avoid harm to
himself or to some other property he owns." 7 Rather, to be in accordance
with section 402A and basic tort policy, strict liability in tort should be
available to every person who can show that the defendant manufactured
a defective product that was unreasonably dangerous and that caused injury to person or property." 8 Further, while' many various policy justifications for strict liability have been espoused, ranging from simply providing
a short cut to liability when negligence is difficult to prove,' to providing
purely economic risk distribution,'"0 to providing "incentive" for manufacturers to produce safer products,' the objective is the same in each
case. That objective is protection of the purchaser from unreasonable
risks of harm. ' " As the Texas Supreme Court has noted, this does not
mean that a manufacturer should be held strictly liable in every instance
in which his product fails to perform in accordance with the expectations
of the purchaser, '2 but strict liability should be imposed on manufacturers
of unreasonably dangerous, defective products in order to reduce the risk
of harm to innocent purchasers. 2'
RECONCILIATION OF

Mid Continent, Signal AND Nobility Homes

The decision in Mid Continent is confusing, in light of these considera115. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308, 316 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting).
116. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975); Mid Continent
Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 316-17 (Tex. 1978)
(Pope, J., dissenting).
117. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965);
Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1977).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToR § 402A (1965).
119. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448
(Ct. App. 1976).
120. Milau Assocs., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d
882, 886 (1977).
121. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448
(Ct. App. 1976).
122. See Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1977).

123. See id. at 79. As Justice Pope has said, "A defect that is not unreasonably dangerous, does not result in an accident, or one that must only be repaired or replaced, is not a
tort action." Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308, 317 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting).

124. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386

(1978); Holmquist v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977);
RFSrATEMErr (SECOND) OF

ToRmS § 402A (1965).
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tions, and poses other possible problems for the courts. Division of section
402A property into "other property" and the product itself is likely to
require lengthy and unnecessary litigation in order to distinguish between
the two.2"' Other technical questions, such as how much "other property"
must be damaged before strict liability will be allowed, are raised by the
Mid Continent decision.' 6
The Texas Supreme Court adopted section 402A in 1967.127 Section 402A
requires that the plaintiff allege a defect in the manufacturer's product
rendering it unreasonably dangerous and an injury to the plaintiff or his
property caused by the defect.' Had the supreme court' simply applied
section 402A as it was adopted without the "other property" modification,
the cases of Nobility Homes,'2 Signal Oil, '20 and Mid Continent Aircraft'3 '
could easily be reconciled. Since Nobility Homes did not involve a defective product that was unreasonably dangerous, section 402A was not applicable.3 2 On the other hand, Signal Oil did involve a defective product, but
that defect was not found to have caused the damage.'33 Thus, section 402A
was applicable but the jury findings were unfavorable. 13 Finally, Mid Continent Aircraft involved a defective product found to be unreasonably dangerous and which caused damage to the plaintiff's property. The court
defined the damage to the plaintiffs property as economic rather than
property damage and did not apply section 402A.1 5 Section 402A as written, however, does not limit liability to "other property" damage.' 36 Thus,
section 402A should have been applied 137 since the product was unreasona125. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978);
Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312-13
(Tex. 1978).
126. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 332 (Tex. 1978)
(Pope, J., concurring).
127. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967).
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also Signal Oil & Gas Co.
v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v.
Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting);
Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. 1977).
129. Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
130. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
131. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308
(Tex. 1978).
132. Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. 1977).
133. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 324, (Tex. 1978).
134. Id. at 326; see, e.g., Eck v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 453 P.2d 366, 368 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1969) (proof that product caused injury essential to strict tort liability); Essex Wire
Corp. v. Salt River Project Agr. Improvement & Power Dist., 451 P.2d 653, 660 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1969) (strict tort liability does not eliminate requirement of proving proximate causation);
O'Lander v. International Harvester Co., 490 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Or. 1971) (defect must proximately cause accident for strict liability in tort to apply).
135. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308, 313 (Tex. 1978).
136. See id. at 316 (Pope, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
137. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
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bly dangerous and the damage it caused was to person or property.' This
result is proper regardless of the commercial or non-commercial nature of
the transaction. Transactions between commercial entities may be an important consideration in determining the effect to give to warranties and
disclaimers, but should not affect the overall application of section 402A.
CONCLUSION

Section 402A is the accepted rule applied by the courts to determine
whether a case of strict liability exists. As adopted in Texas, it is applied
in those cases in which an unreasonably dangerous, defective product
causes damage to a person or his property. While case law and the history
and policy considerations of tort law favored its application in Mid
Continent, the Texas Supreme Court chose to do so only with modification. As a result, the "other property" distinction is now law.
The effect of the Mid Continent decision is to place all similar cases in
which a product damages only itself, in the category of economic loss.
Remedy for such loss is to be governed by the Texas Business & Commerce
Code.' As a result, the plaintiff in such a case will be faced with all the
obstacles of contract law such as disclaimer and notice requirements."10
The plaintiff who is lucky enough to hurdle these obstacles will generally
recover only the difference between the value of the product as received
and the value as warranted."' In general, in a case of economic loss the
plaintiff's proof will be more complex, the manufacturer's defenses
stronger, and the recovery less than under strict liability in tort.
Damage to property other than the product itself, however, will release
a plaintiff from the restraints of contract liability. Under Mid Continent,
strict liability in tort will be available when an unreasonably dangerous,
defective product damages "other property" of the consumer. The plaintiff
can avoid contract disclaimers and the like, therefore, by proving damage
to some "other property"."' Should the courts choose to interpret this
308, 319 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77,
78 (Tex. 1977); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
139. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.313 (express warranty), 2.314 (implied
warranty of merchantability) & 2.315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); id. § 17.41-63 (deceptive trade practices-consumer protection
act) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
140. As the plaintiff in Mid Continent learned, obstacles such as "as is" disclaimers are
difficult to overcome. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc.,
572 S.W.2d 308. 313 (Tex. 1978). Additionally, while there is a four-year statute of limitations
under the UCC for breach of warranty, the statute starts to run at the time of the sale, and
notice of breach of warranty must be given before it runs. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
141. 2 J. DOOLEY, MoDERN TORT LAw § 32.31 (1977). This is normally described as the
"benefit of the bargain rule." Id.
142. While proving damage to "other" property may appear to be a heavy burden for
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requirement liberally, the "other property" distinction will not cause
plaintiffs much further concern. And if policy and precedent are any guide,
this is the course Texas courts will follow in future cases in which an
unreasonably dangerous, defective product damages itself.
the plaintiff, one authority has said that "if damage to other property is necessary, it can
almost always be found." Ribstein, Guidelinesfor Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases,
29 MERCER L. REv. 493, 499 (1978).
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